Mots-clés : national - développement - énergie - droits de propriété - gouvernance des organisations - régulation des échanges - efficience technique - histoire et théories économiques - entreprise - entreprises publiques - services
Taking stock from the U.S. experiment in electricity deregulation, this report by Richard Rosen, John Stutz, and Marjorie Kelly explains why deregulation failed with rising rates, increased volatility, and decreased reliability. This failure was unavoidable since electricity does not own the properties of a commodity and a competitive market cannot exist for its trading. Therefore it was irrational to replace public oversight with necessarily flawed market mechanisms.
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Rosen, Richard A., Marjorie Kelly, and John Stutz. 2007. A Failed Experiment: Why electricity deregulation did not work and could not work. Boston: Tellus Institute.